Unleash the small boats!
The benefits of procuring fast attack craft for the Royal Navy
The Royal Navy prides itself on being a ‘global’ force. However, a sizeable part of the Royal Navy’s operations occur in the littoral – congested, shallow waters – and therefore within range of a greater quantity of land-based weapons. While the Royal Navy’s primary surface vessels can operate in such waters, they are arguably too expensive and too few in number to be risked in dangerous taskings which detract from their core ocean-going business. As such, the Royal Navy should consider the procurement of smaller, cheaper, but well-armed, fast attack craft (FAC) for littoral operations.
Under a ‘NATO-first’ defence policy, it is likely that the Royal Navy’s priority area of operations will continue to be the Euro-Atlantic. However, alongside operating in the open waters of the North Atlantic and High North, the Royal Navy will likely be called upon to conduct operations in the Baltic Sea and along the Norwegian coast, and potentially for the defence of home coastal waters. These littoral waters are well-suited to small, fast vessels; it is not surprising that the allied navies of Norway, Sweden and Finland all count FAC among their surface fleets.
The larger surface combatants of the Royal Navy are not optimised for littoral warfare; the vulnerabilities of warships operating close to shore have been exemplified most recently by the sinking of Russian vessels in the Black Sea by Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) and land-based anti-ship missile batteries. While Royal Navy escorts have proven survivable in the Red Sea, it should be noted that the Houthis do not yet have the same ability as peer adversaries to contest the littoral, nor were warships their primary target during the Red Sea Crisis.
Furthermore, in wartime, frigates and destroyers are likely to be prioritised for the defence of open waters in the northern Euro-Atlantic, as are the Royal Navy’s attack submarines (SSNs). This leaves the Royal Navy with very few options for operating in littoral waters such as the Baltic; one of the key areas of operation, it should be noted, for British land forces. Both the Archer class patrol boats and River class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are extremely lightly armed; Royal Navy minehunters will likely be deployed elsewhere in their primary role. As such, there exists a gap for a small but heavily armed FAC class, able to operate in littoral waters and strike the enemy with capable armament.
FAC have several tactical advantages in the littoral over their larger counterparts. Being small and able to operate in shallow, congested waters, FAC are harder to detect by radar, which can be exacerbated by stealthy hull design and electronic warfare measures. Despite their small size, they can pack significant offensive ‘punch’, able to mount sizeable gun and missile armaments and capable of striking both sea and land targets.
This latter capability – and the FAC’s potential to support amphibious and land forces – should be emphasised. The Royal Marines are stressing raiding tactics in their doctrine, and the British Army’s Ranger Regiment is showing a growing interest in key littoral areas of Scandinavia. Furthermore, the Royal Navy’s stretched attack submarine fleet is unlikely to be readily available for special forces insertion due to other taskings. As such, FAC can provide circumspect support to small special operations teams and land forces in the littoral at relatively low cost. Alternatively, FAC could be used to assist amphibious operations alongside other escorts by providing screening, sensing and fire support to the incoming fleet of new Multi-Role Support Ships and Commando Insertion Craft. FAC should not be restricted to sovereign operations either: noting that several allied nations already use the craft, British FAC could be well-placed to operate alongside allied craft in multinational flotillas.
Compared to frigates and destroyers, FAC are relatively cheap and expendable. This ensures that a greater number can be built and, if lost, the relative cost in both materiel and lives is minimised. Furthermore, smaller vessels will generally take less time and money to maintain and refit. Noting the high workload of the Royal Navy’s (shrinking) surface fleet, expanding the number of hulls, yet keeping crew numbers relatively low, can enhance the fleet’s distributed mass, persistent presence and overall strike capability. Hence, the FAC would complement the Royal Navy’s planned surface fleet in peacetime, freeing up destroyers and frigates for other duties while providing a harder-edged presence than OPVs. This can also include operations outside the Euro-Atlantic; depending on circumstance and the availability of logistical support, FAC could be used along the coasts of Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf for a variety of policing, protection and interdiction taskings.
In wartime, the FAC’s primary roles should be to be strike sea and land targets, to support littoral operations and to serve as forward sensors for other assets. Working either alone or in small squadrons, FAC can manoeuvre fast and aggressively, aiming to impose dilemmas on the adversary – especially regarding targeting – and constrain their freedom of manoeuvre. Defensively, they can keep larger ships at bay from friendly shores with missiles, or use gun armaments and speed to defeat other small vessels or surface drones at close range.
The disadvantages of FAC are, of course, their low levels of ocean-going seaworthiness, range, magazine depth, and lack of broad capability. However, the point of FAC is not to provide a wide range of capabilities; they are specialised vessels designed specifically for littoral combat within a relatively short distance of friendly harbours.
A suggested FAC would displace no more than 400 tonnes and have a relatively simple hull design – the key design principles should be simplicity and affordability. While an element of modularity would be ideal, the basic package must include a main gun and medium-to-long range precision weaponry able to strike both sea and land targets – examples would be the Naval Strike Missile or a form of loitering munition. A light close-in weapon system should be included in order to provide point-defence against aerial threats – especially uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) – alongside a simple electronic warfare suite to assist with deception and electronic protection. The ability to launch small-to-medium sized UAVs and USVs alongside the main armament should also be considered to broaden the range of capabilities.
Noting the rapid advances in autonomous technology, consideration might be given as to whether such a FAC itself could be optionally crewed in certain circumstances and paired with larger motherships. However, there are significant advantages to operating a crewed vessel, not least the ability to operate independently far from motherships in electronically degraded environments.
Finally, FAC offer significant opportunities from the perspective of personnel and training. Fundamentally, more hulls provide additional training opportunities for personnel to gain valuable sea time. It should also be noted that, with the transition of the minehunter fleet into predominantly autonomous vessels, the number of ship command appointments for early-to-mid career warfare officers is shrinking fast. FAC provide a perfect opportunity for leaders to command early in their careers on a class of ship which demands aggressive, innovative tactics.
The Royal Navy has a proud history of using small, cheap FAC to great effect, perhaps most notably seen in the exploits of Coastal Forces during the Second World War. With the growing demand for deployable mass, and renewed focus on the Euro-Atlantic theatre, there is once again a requirement for these small, but capable, vessels.
Matthew Palmer is a military officer, a Richmond Fellow of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, and also writes in a personal capacity at Cracking Defence. His views are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of Defence or His Majesty’s Government.
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Excellent case for small boats. A further point is that the loss of a low cost replaceble ship does not reduce RN capability, and thus is a further deterent to an opponent crossing the line of conflict. A small fleet of small boats would not just enhance training and seamanship but also help develop leaders.
OCEA UK exports such vessels globally. Using aluminium smaller vessels can still have great endurance and good seakeeping. Aluminium also allows for higher payloads - and the export market wants firepower. A fleet of smaller vessels also improves coverage, greater fleet system of system survivability by distribution (separating sensors and weapons), speed of build, speed of replacement and lower capital expense. All arguments that are accepted in the export markets.