Europe in the Indo-Pacific
A friendly dialogue from a friendly provocation
Here at The Broadside, we recently published a piece by Peter Dombrowski: ‘Why Europe should limit naval operations in the Indo-Pacific: A friendly provocation from an American’. The arguments therein sparked some dialogue between Peter and our Associate Editor, Kevin Rowlands, which we wanted to share with you.
The question of whether European navies should have a global outlook or focus closer to home is a core debate of the current moment, and fostering these kinds of discussions is part of our mission in these pages. If you have your own thoughts to share on this topic, please do leave your comments!
Kevin Rowlands:
I believe that Peter wanted his article to be a little provocative. Well, let me rise to the bait. While his argument that European navies should concentrate in their own backyard and cut the vanity deployments to the other side of the world has many supporters on both sides of the Atlantic, I feel it is short-sighted for a number of reasons. Let me set out just three.
First, what he suggests is, effectively, a spheres of influence argument: ‘You take here, we’ll look after there’. Such approaches rarely work for any length of time, due to ‘national interests’. Let’s be frank: as the political turmoil of recent months has shown, countries cannot always rely on other countries to be the stalwart ally they hoped them to be. Sometimes, sovereignty matters. Lord Palmerston’s line is often quoted, but it is applicable here: ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies; our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’
Second, for all the current buzzwords such as ‘warfighting’ and ‘lethality’, armed forces, especially navies, do not have one single role. They may be required to fight, i.e., their military role, but they are also arms of the state – supporting the state’s ‘national interests’ already mentioned. If the Indo-Pacific is the economic centre of gravity and the United Kingdom (UK) and other European countries have territorial, economic and cultural interests there, why should it be ignored? Britain wants prosperity, and there are friendships and partnerships to be built and strengthened. Naval diplomacy is a thing, and it works.
Third, if the UK does have to fight, threats are global, so responses must be global too. Russia is a Pacific nation. The People’s Republic of China is increasingly active in the Euro-Atlantic. We talk about the indivisibility of theatres, and I think that is right. I’m reminded that one of the first major naval actions of World War I, a conflict most people would think of as European in origin and military focus, was not on the seas around Europe, but in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile. Do we really think a future conflict would be geographically constrained? Britain needs to be familiar with potential operating environments.
There are many other points which could be made, from treaty commitments, to burden sharing, to freedom of navigation operations, to capability development and integration, even to the retention of people, but I’ll leave those for others.
Peter Dombrowski:
I am of course grateful that Kevin took the time to write a thoughtful response. This is exactly as I had hoped when I drafted my article. The reply, however inadvertently, makes points which I am comfortable with, but draws different conclusions.
Yes, I am proposing a division of labour; it is one which fits squarely with the short-to-medium-term national interests of European states. The United States (US) has clearly indicated that it has prioritised the Indo-Pacific and the ‘China threat’ above developments – however serious – in Europe. I believe that the most serious threat, the proverbial shark closest to the boat, is continued Russian revanchism. Europe can no longer rely on the US or, more to the point, the US Navy. Thus, it needs to be prepared to deter and fight potential scenarios in the European theatre without American help. I wish this were not so. National survival is the preeminent national interest for all European states.
Yes, the Indo-Pacific the economic centre of gravity for the UK, virtually all of Europe and the US. But note I did not suggest economic, political, diplomatic or even general military disengagement. European nations can, and must, continue to engage with the Indo-Pacific, and not solely because of territorial commitments. And, while I take the point about the wider utility of navies beyond warfighting in a time of crisis, when the immediate threats loom large and European naval and military rebuilding remain in their infancies, potential kinetic threats must be prioritised. There simply are not enough platforms and people – ships, warplanes and supporting systems – to spread them thinly, at least until either the Russian threat recedes or numbers and capabilities are again commensurate with responsibilities.
Kevin Rowlands is Head of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, Visiting Professor in the Departments of War Studies and Defence Studies at King’s College London and Associate Director of the Sea Power Laboratory. The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity.
Peter Dombrowski is the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at the US Naval War College. The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Naval War College or any other US government department or agency.
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It's delightful to have two such eminent scholars debating so articulately and politely.
I don't however entirely agree with Peter Dombrowski's argument which is, if I have it right, essentially that European navies should focus on the Russian threat to the exclusion of deployments to the Indo-Pacific. There is of course much he says that is unarguable, including the threat from Russia and that European navies have atrophied in recent years. Yet I am not sure that his conclusion follows from those premises.
What is being discussed are intermittent deployments to the Indo-Pacific of mostly a relatively small proportion of European navies. Their temporary absence from Mediterranean or North Atlantic waters generally makes only a transitory difference to the balance of power there, and of course the geopolitical situation is considered just before they depart and they can always be called back. Maritime power is far more flexible than significant land power or land based air power.
Meanwhile, intermittent European deployments to the Indo Pacific bring many advantages, which we can list under Corbett's military, economic and diplomatic triad.
Militarily, if the US ends up in a war with China it may well be grateful for European military support, for the European navies have not just excellent general capabilities (by some measures the best air defence ship in the world is a British type 45 destroyer) but also some general abilities that the US lacks either partly or entirely, including minehunting and diesel electric submarines. Geographically, the Europeans also helpfully approach from a different direction, which could be useful in the Indian Ocean and in imposing economic warfare on China. It is also the case that countries such as the UK, with its close ties to Australia, New Zealand, Brunei and elsewhere, have military interests in the Indo-Pacific which are distinct from those of the US. Moreover, the great advantage of maritime power is its flexibiliy and the ability to impose costs in different theatres. Who knows when it may be in the interests of European navies to deliver military action beyond the Euro-Atlantic? Conversely, putting the USA out of the picture for a moment, if countries such as Japan and South Korean think that the Europeans might help them, then perhaps they might be more prepared to help the Europeans. That is before we start to discuss relations with India (a democracy of 1.4 billion people) and many other valued states.
Economically, South and East Asia's economic heft has been mentioned, and warship visits are good for military sales and much more.
Diplomatically, the task group deployment such as that being currently led by the UK's HMS Prince of Wales helps to bind European allies together, and the vital and long standing links that the UK and other European powers have with countries in the Indo Pacific. It also supports and prepares for the military effects mentioned above. Shifting to look at the situation from the Chinese point of view, Europanm deployments complicate their decidions, giving more coutnries to consider as China decides whether to go to war, and if so how. There is a parallel here with the UK and France becoming nuclear armed states in the Cold War. Initially the USA prefered that the Europeans didn't have nuclear weapons because it complicated their face off with the Soviet Union, but eventually the Americans realised that such European military capabilities complicated the Soviet calculations and imposed additional restraints.
Finally, far from imposting financial costs, the reality is that to have warships ready to go when the time comes you have to use them in the meantime. Moreover, such deployments can be good for personnel retention.
In sum, therefore, the USA's shift to the Pacific as seen under the last four Presidents, and its more erratic decision making as seen more recently, actually make European naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific more important than before.
Andrew Livsey
Most interesting that a discussion about whether European countries should have naval activity in the Pacific, should turn out to be a discussion between a Brit and a Yank about British naval activity in the Pacific and division of labour between the UK and the US.
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For one, is the UK a European power, seriously? Seen rrom the US, yes. Seen from Europe, hardly. Seen from the UK... unclear.
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Of course, the most interesting part about the original proposition is that it comes when the Trump administration is set to redefine AUKUS-pocus, as to erase the original idea of tripartite security involvement in the Pacific, and to replace it with a "spheres of influence" approach whereby the US would focus on the Pacific and Europeans, including the UK, would be expected to focus on Europe and to quit believing they may have reasons to look to the rest of the world.
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So, as a real European, albeit a particular breed, I'm sorry that I have to bring you both back into the real world.
France is a Pacific nation. Meaning there are bits of France in the Pacific. And there are bits of France in the Indian Ocean as well. And despite the present limitations to its naval power, France intends to keep exercising sovereignty over its Pacific territories and it's massive national waters and EEZ.
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So, in the French case, there's no question of whether there will be continued naval activity in the Pacific, but only a question of how much and to what effect.
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The AUKUS-pocus trick, the way it was carried out, and the present US attitude to Europe and France, all point to the fact that there can be no reliance on the US, and probably not even trust about the US respecting undefended sovereignty. You should therefore expect France to keep pursuing its own strategic policy in the Indo-Pacific. And even to try and convince Australia to once again be part of a collective regional project with France, Indonesia or India, rather than to keep believing in the AUKUS fantasy. In this, US policies may prove to be of great help, as they are bound to keep pushing Australian security interest ever farther to the background, in favour of US-only interest in using Australia as a forward base and a reserve of resources.
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It is even possible that US unilateralism and lack of consideration for its allies' interests will ultimately push Asian partners to join forces with France and other European powers, as to participate together in some form of continuation of the international order such as envisioned by China, Russia and a few others, notably Gulf monarchies.
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This will not be a time of redefining the workings of a US-Europe partnership on the global scale. This will be the time of US self-exclusion, first, and then exclusion by others, from the international order. If the US seeks to push Europe out of the Pacific, then the US will add some more conflict to its worries in that particular region.