Why Europe should limit naval operations in the Indo-Pacific
A friendly provocation from an American
I fully recognise the awkwardness of offering advice to my European colleagues about how to approach naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific. Obviously, as an American, I do not have a proverbial ‘dog in the hunt’. What European governments decide to do in the maritime domain is their choice and theirs alone. This is especially true as it appears that Europe writ large and the United States (US) are beginning a period of conscious decoupling. Greater European strategic autonomy may be here to stay whether transatlanticists like it or not. That said, international security specialists have an obligation to analyse the strategic operational implications of greater European autonomy.
I believe that it is in the interest of all parties for European navies to focus their efforts on the seas and oceans surrounding the continent – the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the North Sea, the northern Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean. This includes the deployments of individual states, those made under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the nascent potential for warships to deploy further east under the European Union (EU) flag. The challenges and threats closer to home are sufficiently serious, and European navies have suffered from reduced numbers and capabilities to the point where they may not be able to meet a serious challenge from Russia, especially if the US becomes a less reliable ally or withdraws naval combat power from the region. More to the point, in the event of a shooting war between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US alongside its Pacific allies, ‘European states have precious few resources that they could deploy to the Pacific, and they would hardly want to spare them if the Russians were threatening’.
To be clear, the deployment of French, British, Italian and German warships to the Indo-Pacific remains fairly limited when considered relative to the naval power already in the region and the fleet elements remaining in European waters. And many of the most substantial and regularised deployments are made by European states, such as France and the United Kingdom (UK), who continue to control some Indo-Pacific territories. But warships sent east are not only unavailable for NATO or national missions, they also incur operational expenses and high maintenance costs while placing stress on available manpower. Even expansive arguments for greater NATO involvement in the region suggest ‘deterring and defending from afar’ rather than more naval presence or operations. And the EU’s efforts focus on naval diplomacy and maritime security rather than providing combat power to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
There are three potential scenarios in which European navies might be forced to fight the Russian Navy on the high seas as well as the littorals, closed seas and narrow seas surrounding the European mainland. While the Russian Navy has lost considerable combat power during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its prospects may be improving as Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, has pledged a ₽8.4 trillion (£75 billion) naval expansion over the next ten years. In any case, the maritime geography of the European seas is replete with chokepoints and waters vulnerable to Russian land-based air and missile power. In sum, Russia could use its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to challenge Europe’s ability to provide the sea control necessary for serious operations on land. The cases described are illustrative and would, of course, require much more serious tactical and operational analysis to understand from a naval perspective.
Russian territorial revanchism: Even as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine remains unresolved or settles into another cold peace, strategists have suspected that Putin has not satisfied his appetite for territorial reversals. Experts have speculated on future attacks on the Baltic States, Finland and Poland, among others. Conventional military operations to support deterrence or warfighting in any of these places would largely be land-based. But modern warfare is inherently joint: surely Russia would employ its navy in support of ground operations in this scenario, as it did in 2022.
Russian maritime infrastructure campaign: Over the past decade, strategists have noted Russian involvement in attacks on critical undersea infrastructure, ranging from gas pipelines to fibre-optic and power cables. Planners have even envisioned Russian attacks on Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) and Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) used to support ground operations. For navies, this scenario is both easier and harder to respond to. It is easier in the sense that a ‘grey zone’ or hybrid campaign might not require engagement with Russian naval forces, but with Russia’s so-called shadow fleet and other covert forces. On the other hand, protecting critical infrastructure is often very difficult using traditional methods. Finally, there is no reason that a campaign against Europe’s maritime infrastructure might not accompany territorial attacks or conventional naval operations.
Russian-Chinese cooperation over Taiwan: The closeness of the Russian-Chinese partnership is one of the important mysteries of the global security environment. While both countries have conducted maritime exercises together, and with partners such as Iran, no one, perhaps not even Putin or Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, knows if the relationship could withstand major combat operations in the Indo-Pacific. There is reason to suspect that one side or another would decide that the benefits of combined – or at least supporting – operations would be outweighed by encouraging the US and Europeans, not to mention Asian powers, to resolidify their alliances and fight a combined global campaign in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and perhaps even the greater Middle East. Yet, for both sides, the temptation of opportunistic behaviour might be too much to resist. If the PRC decided to climb through the so-called ‘Davidson window’, Russia might take advantage of a distracted world to put pressure on Europe with both naval and land-based attacks.
How the US might react if European navies focus more closely on the region’s neighbouring seas and oceans is unclear. Officially, there might be expressions of concern, especially if it appears that Europe’s naval withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific is a harbinger of wider political and diplomatic disengagement from the region. Given the economics and politics underlying Europe’s relations with the PRC and the other leading countries in the region, wider disengagement is highly unlikely. Behind the scenes in some naval circles, however, there may be relief. If the US Navy is under less pressure to support naval operations in Europe, it will have greater resources available for the Indo-Pacific. Finally, forward presence and naval diplomacy aside, even collectively, the European navies that deploy to the Indo-Pacific would not provide game-changing combat power during a major peer conflict with the PRC.
This does not mean that European navies should not increase their numbers and capabilities. It does not mean that there should be reduced collaboration, less effort to improve interoperability or smaller naval budgets. Rather, it means that their numbers and capabilities should be optimised for operations in the European theatre. Naval strategists, officials and intelligence analysts should watch developments in the Russian Navy carefully – how soon will Putin’s new investments pay off, what capabilities are innovative (incorporation of more lethal missiles, uncrewed systems and so forth), where will new systems be based and are there any subsequent doctrinal changes?
I have little expectation that my arguments will convince anyone – the allocation of limited naval resources is a deeply emotional issue for European navies and a serious conundrum for strategists. What I hope, rather, is that this modest contribution to ongoing debates will help strengthen the arguments, the pros and cons, as to how engaged European navies should be as events play out in the Indo-Pacific. In any case, I suspect that resource constraints and a clear-eyed assessment of national and supranational interest will result in limited deployments and, within those, a focus on the western Indian Ocean. Surely countries such as France with territorial interests will periodically continue to show the flag regardless.
Dr Peter Dombrowski is the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at the US Naval War College.
The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Naval War College or any other US government department or agency.
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I believe that Prof Dombrowski wanted his article to be a little provocative. Well, let me rise to the bait. While his argument that European navies should concentrate in their own backyard and cut the vanity deployments to the other side of the world has many supporters on both sides of the Atlantic, I feel it is short-sighted for a number of reasons. Let me set out just three.
First, what Prof Dombrowski suggests is, effectively, a spheres of influence argument. “You take here, we’ll look after there.” Such approaches rarely work for any length of time because of “national interests.” Let’s be frank. As the political turmoil of recent months has shown, countries cannot always rely on other countries to be the stalwart ally they hope them to be. Sometimes, sovereignty matters. Lord Palmerston’s line is often quoted, but it is applicable here: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies; our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
Second, for all the current buzzwords such as “warfighting” and “lethality” armed forces, especially navies, do not have one single role. They may be required to fight, i.e. their military role, but they are also arms of the state supporting the state’s “national interests” mentioned above. If the Indo Pacific is the economic centre of gravity and the UK and other European countries have territorial, economic and cultural interests there, why would we ignore it? We want prosperity, there are friendships and partnerships to be built and strengthened – naval diplomacy is a thing and it works.
Third, if we do have to fight, threats are global and responses must be global, too. Russia is a Pacific nation. China is increasingly active in the Euro Atlantic. We talk about the indivisibility of theatres, and I think that is right. I’m reminded that one of the first major naval actions of the First World War, a conflict most people would think of as European in origin and military focus, was not on the seas around Europe but in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile. Do we really think a future conflict would be geographically constrained? We need to be familiar with potential operating environments.
There are many other points which could be made from treaty commitments, to burden sharing, to freedom of navigation operations, to capability development and integration, even to the retention of people, but I’ll leave those for others.