Drones, ports and power
Reshaping maritime security
A wake-up call in slow motion
Back in 2022, when Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff, described drones as ‘the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] of our generation’, it may have sounded like a dramatic warning. But recent incidents – such as drone sightings at His Majesty’s (HM) Naval Base Devonport or near Trident submarine facilities in Faslane – suggest that his words were more prophetic than alarmist. The United Kingdom’s (UK) most secure naval bases are now being routinely approached – and even penetrated – by small flying machines which anyone can buy online. These aren’t just isolated breaches or minor annoyances. They signal a growing vulnerability in how Britain protects its maritime assets, especially as drone technology becomes cheaper, smarter and more widely available.
How drone threats have evolved
The rise of drones in the maritime domain has unfolded in three primary stages. First came the era of surveillance. In the 2010s, commercial drones made it easy for anyone to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Where once only state actors with satellites or spy planes could observe naval movements, now a hobbyist drone costing a few hundred pounds can quietly hover over bases and ships, gathering high-resolution footage. A striking example occurred in 2021, when activists used a drone to film sensitive submarine equipment at Rosyth dockyard. This showed just how accessible high-level surveillance had become.
Next came the shift towards weaponisation. Between 2020 and 2023, drones were no longer just flying cameras: they became weapons of war. In Ukraine, low-cost maritime drones have sunk over a dozen Russian naval vessels. The Houthi rebels in Yemen have similarly used drones to attack commercial shipping and naval targets in the Red Sea. These systems cost a fraction of what a single Royal Navy patrol boat might spend on fuel, but have managed to damage or destroy high-value targets. More recently, in June 2025, Ukraine launched a mass drone strike – dubbed Operation SPIDER’S WEB – deep into Russian territory, using over 100 First Person View (FPV) drones to strike multiple airbases, damaging or destroying more than 40 aircraft including Tu‑95 and Tu‑22M strategic bombers. This unprecedented strike demonstrated that even hardened inland targets are now within reach of low-cost, precision drone attacks. Suddenly, drones are no longer tools for spying – they have teeth.
In 2025, an even more concerning phase is being entered: that of drone swarms. These groups of drones can coordinate with one another, acting like a hive mind rather than individual units. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently demonstrated this capability in naval exercises near Taiwan, where dozens of drones operated in tandem to simulate a mass assault. The same tactic, applied to a Royal Navy base or fleet, could overwhelm existing defences and cause severe damage before traditional systems respond.
Why the Royal Navy is at risk
Several longstanding issues make the Royal Navy especially vulnerable to these evolving drone threats. One of the most significant problems is a mismatch between the speed of change in drone technology and the Royal Navy’s ability to adapt accordingly. As recently as 2021, the Royal Navy’s Future Maritime Aviation Strategy earmarked a tiny portion of its 3% budget for counter-drone measures. This may have seemed reasonable in peacetime, but the security landscape has since shifted dramatically. By comparison, the United States (US) Navy already spends five times more on such capabilities.
Another challenge lies in the fragmented nature of drone regulation in the UK. The Civil Aviation Authority, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) all play different roles in regulating drones, but there is no unified framework. This has led to loopholes, such as those utilised by smugglers who, in 2023, flew drones weighing under 250 grammes – thus exempt from many restrictions – across the Thames Estuary to deliver illegal goods. In military settings, such legal ‘grey areas’ could be exploited by hostile actors to gather intelligence or stage attacks without triggering an appropriate security response.
A third hurdle is the critical funding shortfalls (amounting to £16.9 billion), as acknowledged in the MOD’s Equipment Plan 2023-2033. These have delayed drone-defence upgrades at naval bases, thus leaving ports vulnerable to aerial threats. As observed in recent naval conflicts, critical port infrastructure frequently lacks integrated drone detection and hard-kill systems, leaving facilities vulnerable to low-cost attacks.
What can be done
Fixing these shortcomings will require more than new gadgets or a few quick fixes. A long-term, coordinated approach involving legal and technological changes is necessary.
On the legal front, regulations need to catch up with reality. The UK’s drone laws should be updated to make incursions near naval bases a serious criminal offence on par with espionage. Introducing rules like mandatory geofencing for all major ports could help prevent drones from entering restricted areas in the first place.
Technology will, of course, play a vital role. The Dragonfire laser system, currently in development, promises to neutralise small drones with pinpoint accuracy and no ammunition cost. But systems like this should be rolled out more quickly to provide meaningful protection. At the same time, integrating drone detection into existing radar and surveillance systems would allow bases and fleets to spot incoming threats earlier. Private actors, such as shipping companies and port operators, could be encouraged to invest in drone defence through insurance incentives or regulatory credits.
Why this matters now
Beyond the immediate risk to ships or bases, there is a more profound strategic concern. Every time a drone gets close to a Royal Navy facility without consequence, it chips away at the sense of invulnerability which underpins deterrence. Adversaries, whether hostile states or terrorist groups, take note of what they can get away with. Port disruptions could exacerbate supply-chain crises, mirroring the 300% cost increases and four-week delays already plaguing 55% of British exporters. But more than money is at stake. The UK’s ability to project naval power and defend its interests depends upon the perception that its maritime defences are not easily breached.
Britain has no shortage of talent or technology. What is required is the will to act at the speed of the threat. As Gen. Sir Gwyn Jenkins, First Sea Lord, recently warned, this isn’t a lesson the Royal Navy can afford to learn the hard way.
Klaudia Maciata is a global affairs and security leader with expertise in offshore wind operations, hybrid threats and energy diplomacy in the Baltic Sea region. A contributor to NATO Review and a passionate social science researcher, she works with a leading renewable energy provider, advancing international cooperation and female leadership in the offshore sector.
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