The air littoral
Incremental change with fundamental consequences
Above the front lines of the current conflict in Ukraine, stretching back into Ukraine itself, deep into Russia and over the Black Sea, the skies are swarming with drones, both remotely and autonomously piloted. They are not evenly distributed, instead being concentrated a few thousand feet above the Earth’s surface, and along the fighting front. Flying drones range from small enough to hold in a human hand – used to look around corners – to several metres across and hundreds of kilogrammes (kg) in weight – able to fly thousands of kilometres. Electronic signals from radars, associated jammers and spoofers, radios and other remote controls also saturate this zone. It is a daunting environment in which to operate anything, let alone manned strike aircraft, battlefield helicopters or tactical air transport. This is the ‘air littoral’.
Although not fundamentally a new domain, the concept of an air littoral as the contested edge between the air and surface can help shape thinking to respond usefully to its challenges and opportunities. Existing equipment can no longer control the air in the way we are used to, and the cost differential between weapon and target is utterly unsustainable. Doctrinal supremacy or superiority is now out of reach. Campaign planning and execution must therefore change, as must equipment and training. Crucially, this transitional domain requires understanding and embracing the electromagnetic spectrum; an evergreen operational consideration must become the foundation for all operations.
The spectrum is the terrain
The air littoral requires a new conception because it is so highly crowded, contested and degraded: thousands of objects are operating in this space amid dense electromagnetic jamming and noise. The electromagnetic spectrum itself is occasionally termed a ‘domain’, but perhaps it is more usefully termed a ‘dimension’ because it cuts across land, sea, air and space. All modern warfighting assets operate within and rely upon it, especially drones. Although long understood as a critical element, the first high-end system designed specifically around the electromagnetic spectrum has only very recently been fielded – the F-35 Joint Combat Aircraft. For most current warfighting systems, the electromagnetic spectrum has been addressed as an afterthought, such as with bolt-on defensive aid suites, Global Positioning System (GPS) or other signal jammers. Ships and submarines have long carried these capabilities, but they are not woven into the fabric of those vessels.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air campaign planning – alongside that of NATO allies and partners – has been conducted largely in accordance with the philosophy set out in John A. Warden III’s 1988 essay ‘The Air Campaign’. Its overriding premise is that air supremacy is paramount; no country has won a war, or even a major campaign, in the face of an enemy with air superiority, but also none have ever lost while maintaining air superiority.
Dominating the air has always relied on dominating the electromagnetic spectrum. To achieve this, combat air was integrated with suppression, jamming and encryption. This became a specialisation known as electronic warfare, rather than a foundation of operations. To thrive in the air littoral, this must change.
Golden sledgehammers for nuts
Warden’s maxims remain true, of course. But existing combat air cannot defend, attack or support at the pace and scale that is meaningful to surface forces. Too expensive and too incapable, it cannot control the air littoral. To quantify roughly: a single fighter aircraft might carry eight or ten missiles, which are optimised to defeat other aircraft of similar size and performance. Short-range surface-to-air missile batteries might have 15 or 20 missiles available. Russian drone attacks frequently launch more than 150 in a single wave, or many hundreds over the course of several nights. Defensive radars and weapons, both air and ground-based, are simply not designed to counter threats of this number or size. Throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, flying drones have inflicted one third of tank and fighting vehicle losses, half of artillery losses and three quarters of human losses. Close defence of ships has some effective capabilities, but the fates of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla have shown that dramatic evolution is required. Whether far offshore or in a friendly port, the air littoral is a constant threat as well as, of course, an opportunity.
The proliferation of drones is due to the combination of increased battery energy density, miniaturised flight control technology and mass-manufacture of composite materials. Also on this critical path has been the democratisation of software coding and the ease with which flight models can be developed and distributed, allowing rapid iteration of structures and propulsion. Furthermore, precision – part of combat air’s lethal edge – is now a basic drone characteristic. Low costs allow them to be fielded in large numbers, which generates what is now termed ‘mass precision strike’. Exquisite and expensive air-delivered weapons are being superseded by a larger number of smaller and more precise drones, which swamp existing air defences (an Iranian Shahed 136, for example, can carry 30-50kg of explosives). It does not make existing defences or air weapons entirely obsolete, but without extensive integration with new systems, their returns will continue to diminish.
The air littoral still relies heavily on space for GPS capability, but new technologies for guidance and communication are being rapidly developed – precisely because of the degradation of signal in the air littoral. Optic fibre guidance for drones has been one response, but it is a novel answer with very limited utility, and doubtless will soon be outmatched. Often, electronic warfare is associated with a ‘soft kill’ (i.e., deter rather than damage). But physical destruction must still be part of the solution. Harnessing the electromagnetic spectrum can, for instance, allow control signals to be interfered with in order to make a target easier to hit. Or it may allow agility through a jammed environment to permit communication and ensure greater accuracy.
Forcing change
Littoral forces exist in the form of marines. They specialise in bridging the sub-domain that sits between land and sea. So what of the air littoral? What kind of service can bridge this? In 2001, Israel established an Unmanned Air Systems Administration, which is focused on development and production, but leaves the operating to the single services. In 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces founded a specialised force for drones, which is focused on their operational employment. As these systems’ performance increases, expertise from existing domains will be invaluable. Operating an airborne drone which can travel 1,500 nautical miles requires air expertise, just as a maritime long-distance drone would require the naval equivalent. Existing structures need not (necessarily) be jettisoned, but they must evolve.
As drones further proliferate and become more capable, the air littoral will expand. Actual supremacy or superiority in the air is impossible to achieve with existing equipment and doctrine, and the reality of thousands of airborne devices brings new risks to manned aircraft as well as presenting new threats to assets which they would traditionally defend. Focusing on the electromagnetic spectrum allows all such threats to be seen and addressed as one.
As such, whatever approach to the air littoral is taken should be built around the electromagnetic spectrum from the start. Long before 2022, the threat posed in the air littoral was on display. The consequences for British equipment and the rules-based international order’s arsenal more broadly – and, more importantly, for the training and operating of those forces – are profound. Conceiving this new sub-domain as distinct, and building up from the electromagnetic spectrum, will help the United Kingdom to seize opportunities properly and defend against threats.
Ben Goodwin is a fighter pilot with experience in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and Central Africa. He has been posted to the Ministry of Defence and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Brussels. Previously, he worked at the trading arm of a large bank, focused on foreign exchange and government bonds. He holds a BA in International Relations and History from the University of Sydney.
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