Owning asymmetric naval warfare
Uncrewed systems and their strategic usefulness
Conventional navies’ reactiveness to emerging asymmetric threats
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), with their versatility and low technological threshold, enable new state actors to project naval power at relatively low cost from smaller aircraft carriers. Although all major navies, such as the United States (US) Navy or the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are developing and preparing UAV systems for integration into their naval aviation fleets, it is middle powers, such as Turkey or Iran, which set the pace, rapidly fielding High/Medium-Altitude Long Endurance (HALE/MALE) UAVs, either on vessels which have been refitted from former container ships or aboard helicopter carriers.
All of this comes while navies of free and open nations, particularly the Royal Navy and the US Navy, are still figuring out how to defend most efficiently against these low-cost technologies, and are themselves experimenting with more sophisticated uncrewed flying systems – which will, however, have to wait multiple years until they are fully operational. At the same time, Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) operated by Ukraine have achieved remarkable success in restricting the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s freedom of manoeuvre.
Whether it is UAVs in the air, leaving their mark on naval aviation, or USVs dominating naval surface warfare, uncrewed systems already prove to be a potent asymmetric threat against conventional navies. So, how are the Royal Navy and US Navy planning to incorporate these systems and establish an asymmetric doctrine themselves? And, most importantly, what are the strategic limitations of today’s UAVs and USVs?
Uncrewed aerial and surface vehicles
UAVs in the form of ‘kamikaze drones’ – the latest innovation since Houthi attacks began on commercial shipping in the Red Sea in winter 2023 – have proven to be successful in creating dilemmas for larger and more sophisticated naval task forces, whether by increasing economic costs disproportionately for the defender, or overwhelming or oversaturating complex, high-end, layered air defence networks with cheap mass. But even when operating via remote control, either from onshore or a naval carrier, MALE drones as part of naval aviation, enable (new) state actors to conduct low-risk standalone missions, such as airborne early warning (a capacity envisioned by the Royal Navy), standoff fire launches or anti-submarine warfare.
The threat picture with USVs is no less diverse. Fighting without a standing navy, Ukraine has had to develop new ways to contest Russian maritime dominance in the Black Sea. The result of this is remotely controlled drone boats, such as the Magura series or the Sea Baby. Throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion, they have been designed to fulfil the role of a scalable platform by integrating unguided rockets, explosive warheads in the bow for kamikaze ramming attacks, or even infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles. This has helped Ukraine to force the Russian Navy back from Ukraine’s coastline and to use Novorossiysk rather than Sevastopol as the home port for the Black Sea Fleet.
The new capabilities which these assets may bring to emerging and existing state actors, along with their lower economic costs and reduced human risk, enable more aggressive operations, making them a battle-proven approach already.
Emerging doctrinal concepts
The idea of diverting from traditional large-scale vessels with tremendous firepower embedded into large flotillas is not a new phenomenon exclusively associated with uncrewed technology. The French Jeune École (‘young school’) in the 19th century; the Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces concept to interdict German supply lines with hit-and-run tactics during the Second World War; or the more recent US approach to littoral combat are based on a common strand of thought: disaggregated and distributed operations, in littoral waters, from nearby bases with agile small platforms like patrol boats embedded in a system architecture which networks these small systems with other units.
With the rise of uncrewed systems, these principles have been refined into new concepts. On the United Kingdom’s (UK) side, 2024’s Defence Drone Strategy recognises the importance of UAVs in the maritime domain as a mission-enabling platform. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of June 2025 takes it a step further, envisioning the use of uncrewed systems more broadly for an integrated force, which places an emphasis on cognitive and technological innovation in rapid and scalable operations – a ‘new way of war’. Although not a finished battle doctrine, it sets out the ambition of establishing a Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre in 2026 and integrating large quantities of uncrewed and autonomous assets into the British Armed Forces, and is included within the framework of ‘Atlantic Bastion’ – an effort to increase maritime situational awareness over Russian submarine activities with uncrewed underwater and surface platforms.
The US Navy, on the other hand, has created a Distributed Maritime Operations approach. This enables dispersed operations to mitigate vulnerabilities to enemy fires, allows for fast-paced decision making and facilitates cross-domain network integration. Most significantly, however, it views UAVs and USVs as low-risk and quasi-expandable systems which can be utilised to enhance situational awareness and conduct attacks with attritable mass.
But, as pivotal and advantageous as UAVs and USVs may be, from a strategic perspective they quickly run into issues with the Royal Navy’s and US Navy’s global mission.
Sea control versus sea denial
Sea control, or command of the sea, describes the state at which a navy is able to exercise freedom of action in an area of operation while consolidating command of the sea against its rivals. In doing so, it ensures freedom of navigation, protection of maritime lines of communication and unhindered power projection onshore. Sea denial, on the other hand, is more passive in nature, involving the prevention and contestation of a rival’s ability to exploit control over a maritime area. In operations, the boundaries between both are blurry, as sea denial is often the precondition to sea control. Sea control, in turn, requires countering (and counter-denying) hostile aspirations to disrupt a nation’s own freedom of action. The significant difference between the two terminologies is their associated goals. One may frame it this way: sea control is about sustaining, and sea denial is about contesting.
Uncrewed systems are only viable for sea denial, not sea control
When examining previous cases of use of kamikaze drones in the Red Sea or USVs in the Black Sea, it becomes apparent that they have been employed in relatively confined bodies of water by militarily inferior actors to deny and contest the operations of larger conventional navies. In addition, historic and current doctrines – taking advantage of small but rapid systems and operations – were only ever limited to operations in littoral waters. These limitations appear natural, given that most USVs have limited range and kamikaze drones are taking over standoff tasks – a classic way to exercise sea denial and counter-denial, but not suitable for self-reliant sustainment of control over large areas, like parts of the Pacific or Atlantic oceans, for a more extended period.
Carrier-based UAV aviation, in the form of HALE or MALE drones, may be an exception to this, given their long range and logistical dependence on large ocean-going vessels built specifically for sea control. This enables power projection onshore and consolidation of sea control, even in remote conditions. Still, with their lack of payload capacity, low survivability in contested environments due to a lack of stealth characteristics, or their low weight, which makes them susceptible to weather conditions, even carrier-based UAVs quickly reach their limits in sustaining maritime sovereignty under challenging conditions.
Asymmetric threats in naval warfare are growing quickly. For free and open nations’ navies, particularly the Royal Navy, it would be wise to adopt similarly unconventional doctrines, utilising the help of uncrewed systems. Yet, these platforms – either in the air or at sea – should not be overestimated. They are a prime choice for denying adversaries advantages and creating dilemmas. To maintain sea control worldwide, however, as US naval strategy demands, large conventional flotillas with significant firepower are currently irreplaceable. Thus, the Royal Navy or US Navy employing uncrewed asymmetry is not a one-size-fits-all solution. It boils down to the right strategy, an adequate force posture and an appropriate mix of conventional firepower and uncrewed systems. Uncrewed systems are trailblazing, but not yet the new norm for maritime operations.
Anton Hahn is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS), as well as a Crisis Author at Model NATO Germany and a Senior Research Fellow at EPIS think tank. He also holds Editor positions at both ZUsipol, a think tank, and the Academic Association for Security Studies (BSH), the largest security policy network in Germany.
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