Towards a ‘NATO First’, First-in-NATO maritime strategy
His Majesty’s (HM) Government faces a unique moment in Euro-Atlantic defence and security: not only has conventional warfare returned to the continent since 2022, but the United States (US), the historical guarantor of transatlantic stability, is re-evaluating its relationship with the world – especially Europe – under the ‘America First’ foreign policy of Donald Trump, President of the US. Washington is reprioritising the Indo-Pacific over Europe, accepting increased strategic risk in the latter (expecting more continental nations to take on greater responsibility) to strengthen its deterrent position in the former – a development which began in 2011 under the Obama administration and will almost certainly transcend the second Trump administration.
This dynamic marks the most consequential shift in global geopolitics towards increased conflict since 1945, and demands that the United Kingdom (UK) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) take on greater responsibility for defence. The recognition of these realities is made clear in the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published on 2nd June 2025. The Review should, however, go further, and use the proposed increase in resources to drive a systemic change in Britain’s grand strategy.
HM Government’s accompanying proposed budgetary increase for defence to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027 and 3% by the end of the next Parliament (subject to economic and fiscal conditions) represents a singular opportunity to go beyond the operational commitments of the Review and instead return to Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy; one where the UK places greater emphasis on high-end naval capabilities, establishing control and dominating the high seas of the North Atlantic, and enabling conventional continental operations at a distance. Such an approach would make the necessary trade-offs – which will inevitably result when fiscal realities constrain the SDR’s ambitions – more palatable while still delivering armed forces which are more capable and more effective than an overly thinned, multi-domain force.
As such, the additional resources should be allocated along the following principles, which recognise geostrategic necessities and political realities. While the temptation to spend on idealised futuristic capabilities is real, emphasising immediate needs will generate outsized effects, creating space for the future force.
The immediate UK defence spending priorities must be offsetting the multi-year losses and de-capitalisation of the British Armed Forces. This means first bringing the British Army to a realistic operational strength by aligning organisational tables with personnel and equipment, leveraging technology to increase lethality and offset numerical inferiority. It necessitates recapitalising the equipment sent to Ukraine and covering off existing stockpile gaps and shortfalls which pre-dated Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Only by matching paper strength with practical deployable forces can the UK meet its existing military obligations (such as in Estonia), something which is critical prior to any reconsideration of Britain’s role in the world (for example, serving in a security assurance role in Ukraine).
As with the genesis of the maritime strategy, the UK’s continental land role, while important, is not decisive, and is secondary to its naval capabilities and continental enabling function. Focusing on the former over the latter as an organising principle will see a more capable and more credible British military in Europe and further afield.
Should the proposed NATO member defence spending commitment expected at the forthcoming Summit in The Hague – 3.5% of GDP for core defence spending and 1.5% for ‘other’ defence-related expenditures – materialise, NATO will generate increasingly capable land forces necessary to deter Russia and secure its eastern flank in the land domain. Even if a durable ceasefire is reached for Ukraine, and the US can de-risk the relationship with Russia, Moscow will seek to regenerate its forces and present a renewed challenge to continental security, especially in the maritime domain.
Central to a ‘NATO First’ maritime strategy, Britain must ‘make the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap great again’ by generating and fielding a robust air defence umbrella and aggressive anti-submarine capabilities. From the GIUK gap to the Wider North and Arctic (including into the Barents Sea), and to the Baltic Sea, Britain must operationalise the Royal Navy’s ‘Atlantic Bastion’ concept and become the dominant naval power able to contest Russian conventional naval threats and sub-threshold operations. Investments here will see the UK better able to augment and support NATO member state operations, such as BALTIC SENTRY, and complement US missions further afield.
Constructing additional Type 26 and Type 31 frigates will take time, but investments now in shipbuilding infrastructure will generate necessary future capacity – provided that HM Government can (and indeed it should) triple lock the expenditure and operational costs of the additional vessels beyond 2035. Until those keels are laid and the ships christened, increased allocations for operations and maintenance, as well as spare parts and munitions, should increase both deployment tempo and mission duration.
The SDR rightly highlights the development of a ‘New Hybrid Navy’, which will offset the time and capability delta between allocation and new vessel deployment. Additional time and resources should be spent on investing in autonomous capabilities to augment ship-borne assets, particularly to offset the time between the demise of the Type 23 and the arrival of the Type 26 and Type 31 classes. The Review’s target of growing the nuclear-powered attack fleet by ‘up to’ 12 SSN-AUKUS submarines (to replace seven Astute class boats), fielding one every 18 months, will require considerable sustained investment and Treasury resources. Additional focus on deepening integration and interoperability among the US and NATO allies, creating a maritime ‘Digital Targeting Web’ (aka a ‘kill web’) of sensors, munitions and networks, is vital. NATO members, such as Norway, Finland and Sweden, should be encouraged to build close in-shore vessels and amphibious assets which can secure the maritime domain and contest Russian aggression. Greater resource expenditure here, instead of on large, exquisite programmes, will yield greater long-term benefits – a more capable and more survivable force.
The Royal Navy should also ensure the ongoing viability of the continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD). Additional resources should bring forward the deployment and full operational capability (FOC) of the Dreadnought class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and accompanying training of personnel. Additional resources should also be directed towards community development and skills retention in Faslane, Barrow-in-Furness and Derby. Only by building attractive communities with strong schools will the Royal Navy and the accompanying defence industrial base be able to attract and retain the skilled personnel necessary for the construction of the Dreadnought class and the SSN-AUKUS class.
As a material and munitions organising principle, the UK should go beyond the ‘always on’ production approach and adopt the inverse of the interwar period’s ten-year rule: Britain will be almost certain to participate in a regional contingency within the next decade. This will further strain already depressed stockpiles. Placing contracts now for munitions and material is not a luxury, but a necessity. ‘Always on’ is necessary, but not sufficient; rather establishing production targets based on wartime consumption will ensure sufficient stocks for the possibility of war, while ensuring a robust industrial base at home, providing additional support for Ukraine and supplementing any NATO member arsenals which lag in defence production.
In the longer term, the UK should focus on becoming the backstop to the backstop of the US – providing the high-end capabilities which Washington offers currently, but on a regional basis. These capabilities, e.g., space-based and drone-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and services, deep strike and precision targeting, next-generation fighter aircraft and networking capabilities, will support NATO’s defence and deterrence mission in the Euro-Atlantic, as well as augmenting American capabilities when conducting joint operations.
The SDR recognises the changing geostrategic landscape and the opportunity afforded by new and emerging technologies. HM Government should use the Review as a guide, but should also go further – particularly in the maritime domain – by using the proposed spending increases to adopt a strategic and operational focus which is based on a ‘NATO First’ maritime strategy. By rebuilding the British Army to match paper targets with actual deployable capabilities, and emphasising defence and deterrence in the North Atlantic, Baltic Sea and Wider North, Britain can play a constructive and defining leadership role in continental security while ensuring that domestic security and expeditionary capabilities are provided. This approach also drives industrial growth, job creation and skills enhancement – all of which are priorities of HM Government – while underpinning the concept that strong maritime defence and technical innovation is pivotal to defence being the engine of economic growth.
Joshua C. Huminski is the Senior Vice President for National Security and Intelligence Programmes, and the Director of the Mike Rogers Centre for Intelligence and Global Affairs at the Centre for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.
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