Navigating the return of geography
Maps, strategy and rivalry
The use (and abuse) of maps to advance strategic narratives is not new. From Napoleon Bonaparte to Sykes-Picot, cartographical illustration has long been a tool for justifying claims and conquest. However, with the post-Cold War liberal euphoria firmly behind us, and resurgent state-on-state competition apparently here to stay, the map is front and centre once more. The Indo-Pacific – a new geopolitical centre of gravity – is one region of the world where this is being felt more fervently than most.
Arising from the 2007 speech of the late Shinzo Abe, former Prime Minister of Japan, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ promotes the ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, binding the Indian and Pacific Oceans together to promote the rule of law across the oceans in the face of a revisionist People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since then, the Indo-Pacific construct has developed apace. The United States (US), France, Germany, South Korea and Australia have all now published Indo-Pacific strategies. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom (UK) now has a Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) minister dedicated to the Indo-Pacific portfolio, and is undertaking Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG2025), its second carrier strike group mission to the region.
However, the Indo-Pacific remains a work in progress. Not only is it contested by Beijing, but its ambiguous – albeit flexible – framing around ‘like-mindedness’ leaves some of its proponents grasping (and at times diverging) over what it is tangibly trying to achieve. In short, the Indo-Pacific is still a map in the making.
A map for every narrative
Much commentary and analysis on the Indo-Pacific has focused on the rivalry between the US and the PRC. How should America, the incumbent hegemon, best constrain and engage in hard balancing to deter the PRC’s revisionist ambitions? Relatively overlooked has been the cartographical approach to strategy pursued by the region’s middle powers, especially Japan.
In March 2023, the Japanese Foreign Ministry published Japan’s ‘New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”’. The new plan is centred around a map placing Japan between two expansive areas, stretching to Madagascar in the west and the Chilean coast in the east. Notably, it includes the South China Sea firmly within this space, while India, Australia, the US and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are all illustrated as stakeholders by virtue of their geography.
The PRC contests such framing, accusing it as a masking strategy for constraining its right to development and progress. Instead, it has deployed its own maps to communicate its revisionist strategic narratives. In August 2023, the PRC’s Ministry of Natural Resources published a ‘standard map’ in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. This map, however, is far from standard. It includes an updated ‘ten-dash line’, which places Taiwan and the entirety of the South China Sea as PRC territory. It also makes disputed claims on its western border with India and, interestingly, on its northern border with Russia.
Both maps demonstrate attempts at using mapmaking as a tool of geopolitical rivalry. They provide political space – justification even – upon which territorial claims and strategic visions can be contested. The UK, although yet to make an appearance, holds a growing convening presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Britain in the Indo-Pacific: A convening power
Despite not publishing its own standalone strategy for the Indo-Pacific like many of its European partners, the UK has been busy forging an array of Indo-Pacific partnerships.
An early endorser of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept, Britain has, since 2021, reaffirmed its security stake through two minilateral agreements. First is the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the UK and the US, signed in 2021 and underpinned by a collective effort to acquire nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs). This was followed by the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between Britain, Italy and Japan, aimed at jointly developing a sixth-generation stealth fighter.
The UK has also made a concerted effort to bind itself institutionally to the Indo-Pacific regional fabric. Becoming the first new ASEAN Dialogue Partner for 25 years in 2021 and joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2024 are two recent examples of British contributions to diplomatic and economic dialogues, as well as a military stake in the regional order.
Moreover, this Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ has been an effort conducted in concert with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. Leading the way has been the implementation of a 2023 Anglo-French agreement to coordinate carrier strike group deployments to the Indo-Pacific. It is no coincidence that CSG2025 deploys hot on the heels of the return of the FS Charles de Gaulle-led carrier strike group from the Indo-Pacific.
Together, this represents an impressive record of Indo-Pacific engagement. How Britain best utilises this reinvigorated network and leverages its convening power is the next key question. Currently, it is one which appears to be going unanswered. This is because within each of its new Indo-Pacific partnerships lies a partner with their own, sometimes divergent, understanding of what the FOIP vision is, and what it aims to achieve.
For Japan, the FOIP vision is aimed at encouraging other maritime democracies to contribute to the status quo: a US-led maritime order. For France, Germany and the European Union (EU) it is more about recognising a shift in the centre of gravity away from the Euro-Atlantic region while striving for multilateralism by engaging with both America and the PRC. Similarly, while ASEAN is content to further the FOIP in the name of maritime cooperation, it also refuses to relinquish its regional autonomy and ‘pick a side’.
This presents a complex course for the UK and CSG2025 to navigate. While the loose and ambiguous framing of the FOIP has proven helpful in getting nations on board, it seems that agreeing on a shared course is more complicated. Still, Britain can successfully plot its own course.
Ensuring strategic advantage: Naval implications
The Royal Navy’s CSG2025 deployment, international by design, is an episodic demonstration of the UK’s persistent commitment to the Indo-Pacific. It shows a British contribution to an FOIP aligned with the essence of the UK’s National Strategic Design: Deterrence by Denial. If implementing this is to be a priority, the role of CSG2025 should be to engage with regional partners who are willing to choose and contribute to disrupting the PRC’s revisionist campaigns in the South China Sea.
This means CSG2025 prioritising port visits, exercises and defence engagement activities with its AUKUS and GCAP partners over its more benign ASEAN and CPTPP networks. Of course, it is not a zero-sum game, but priorities must nevertheless be chosen.
As CSG2025 heads east, Britain is in a strong position to use the Royal Navy to leverage its Indo-Pacific networks to the FOIP’s strategic advantage. If appropriately deployed, the UK’s naval power can help ensure that the British Indo-Pacific narrative prevails.
William Parker writes on defence, strategy and geopolitics, having previously served as a Warfare Officer in the Royal Navy.
Sources:
‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 03/2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ (checked: 08/05/2025).
People’s Network Japanese version, ‘「2023年度版標準地図」を発表 浙江省’ [‘Zhejiang Province releases “2023 Edition Standard Map”’], People’s Daily Japanese Edition, 29/08/2023, https://j.people.com.cn/ (checked: 08/05/2025).
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