A means, not an end

How should Britain approach the New Hybrid Navy?

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The vision of Gen. Sir Gwyn Jenkins, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, of a New Hybrid Navy is central to the Royal Navy’s transformation to ‘warfighting readiness’. Integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled and autonomous systems with conventional platforms – ‘uncrewed wherever possible; crewed only where necessary’ – will deliver a more lethal Integrated Force and strengthen homeland defence. This approach aims to restore competitive edge, as well as regenerate mass at pace and scale in a context of ageing platforms, and persistent recruitment and retention challenges.

This vision represents a necessary adaptation to contemporary warfare. Yet, as this concept shapes future force design, there is a risk that technology will drive strategy rather than enabling it. Building on the First Sea Lord’s speech at DSEI 2025, the success of the New Hybrid Navy and the Royal Navy’s combat readiness hinge on collaboration with industry and allies, which are essential to the planned transformation. However, cooperation also presents challenges and may create vulnerabilities, potentially limiting the Royal Navy’s ability to be fully prepared for war.

Fight tomorrow: The industry

The New Hybrid Navy presents a bold strategic direction aimed at regenerating mass and enhancing competitive advantage. However, claims that autonomy can restore mass effectively are challenged by the harsh realities of implementation. A high-low mix system continues to incur significant costs and makes industry a vital enabler, to the point that some have characterised it as the ‘sixth domain of war’.

Yet, British defence programmes frequently face delays and cost overruns, driven by under-resourced project teams, fragmented supply chains, complex integration requirements and unpredictable demand. Incentives rarely penalise delays, and structural reforms have yet to produce faster delivery times.

Likewise, while acceleration is often a stated priority, the United Kingdom (UK) lacks clear timelines for speeding procurement – underscoring a credibility gap between aspiration and executable plans. Testing and trials inevitably add time to the development of military programmes, and for autonomous and AI-enabled systems these processes are typically demanding, as trust in reliability and safe integration must be demonstrated rather than assumed. Against this backdrop, any assertion that autonomy will rapidly restore mass must be tempered: delivery depends on realistic timelines, coherent planning, sequenced decisions and sustained investment.

Wartime dynamics are likely to intensify these pressures. Britain’s production capacity is comparatively limited compared to rivals such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which surpass the UK in scale and speed, and control essential resources for advanced systems. Britain’s limited direct access to critical materials creates strategic vulnerabilities for its industry, exposing it to geopolitical shocks and logistical disruptions.

Not only is the UK less competitive than its adversaries in peacetime, but reliance on these resources and supply chains could become even more problematic in wartime, potentially hindering Britain’s ability to deliver, repair and sustain advanced systems quickly. While this challenge is recognised, and steps are being taken to improve supply resilience and sovereignty through the Critical Minerals Strategy, its scope remains limited, and is unlikely to address the issue fully.

Furthermore, if the first challenge lies in the speed and scale at which industry can restore mass, the second is equally critical: even as autonomy promises to offset crew shortages, it does not eliminate the human factor. Autonomy is often viewed as a solution to the Royal Navy’s personnel shortages, which have persisted since the Cold War despite recent recruitment gains.

However, autonomy shifts demand highly specialised roles, such as engineers, cyber experts and systems integrators. These skills are scarce in both the British Armed Forces and industry. Without sufficient expertise to build, maintain and repair complex systems both at home and at sea, the New Hybrid Navy risks remaining aspirational rather than operational.

Fight tonight: The allies

The drive to fund the Royal Navy’s future force has led to the early retirement of several capabilities to ease budgetary pressure and address persistent crew shortages. While intended to protect long-term modernisation, this approach has created a vulnerable interim period in which existing capabilities are withdrawn well before replacement systems are available – a risk some argue undermines the Royal Navy’s ability to ‘fight tonight.’

This exposure is most evident in the decision to reduce amphibious lift and afloat support ahead of the delivery of the Multi-Role Support Ships (MRSS) in the early 2030s. Until those vessels enter service, the Royal Navy faces diminished secure access, sustainment, repair and medical support at sea. Rather than a seamless transition, the MRSS programme illustrates how capability retirement has outpaced capability regeneration, leaving critical functions exposed during a decade of heightened strategic uncertainty.

Beyond the operational consequences, retiring platforms before their successors are fully developed sends an unfavourable political signal. In an era where deterrence depends on visible readiness, the resulting loss of availability introduces sovereignty risks at precisely the moment that they are most likely to be tested. It also weakens the UK’s ability to set tempo independently, increasing reliance on allies at a time when the ‘special relationship’ itself is under strain following shifts in American security strategy.

Relying on allies to cover near-term capability gaps is a risky strategy which undermines deterrence. Since this interim period is expected to last longer than initially planned, owing to procurement delays and uncertainties about industry’s capacity to deliver future capabilities, it risks becoming the ‘new normal’.

Deterrence depends on what can be deployed immediately, not on future promises. Therefore, transformation must also support short-term credibility. Without interim solutions and clear readiness plans, Britain risks sending the wrong political message and being unprepared for immediate threats.

The missing conversation: The British Army

Current conversations about warfighting readiness often under-emphasise a crucial element: operational cooperation across domains. While the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) work together on Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) – a close cooperation expected to grow via the Future Air Dominance System – there appears to be limited focus on how maritime forces coordinate with land units.

Commandos are rightly praised for agility and forward deployment, yet their role in enabling the arrival, transfer and sustainment of larger British Army formations is rarely addressed. As the Royal Navy advances its transformation, the absence of a defined joint framework is notable.

The erosion of amphibious capability – most notably the early retirement of the Albion class landing platform docks without a timely replacement – has weakened the land-sea bridge and undermined assured access. Decisions framed as efficiency measures carry strategic consequences: without credible amphibious enablers and integrated planning, the UK’s ability to project, reinforce and sustain ground forces from the sea in contested environments is uncertain.

Recent conflicts underscore why this matters. Peer engagements can still be prolonged, attritional and personnel-intensive, straining logistics and command systems. In such scenarios, initial entry forces cannot operate alone; their purpose is to enable reinforcement and maintain momentum. Yet, readiness debates seldom consider how these transitions occur, or how maritime access connects to land endurance under persistent threat.

Discussions focus mainly on autonomy and future force structures, while interoperability and joint integration are under-emphasised in the Royal Navy’s warfighting readiness discourse. Although its main mission is at sea, the Royal Navy should also support the link to land operations, ensuring maritime forces can enable, sustain and support ground combat efforts over time. Overlooking this could restrict British options and reduce readiness in a period characterised by multi-domain operations.

Key takeaways

Although the Royal Navy recognises that its transformation extends beyond technology – emphasising cooperation with society, industry and allies as crucial to success – an optimistic bias still appears to prevail, potentially overlooking significant challenges which must be acknowledged and addressed to ensure warfighting readiness. Key factors include realistic industrial planning, protecting short-term capabilities and improving interoperability with other services.

This requires clear priorities: technology should support, not drive, transformation. Even if autonomy shapes future forces, people remain central. Sustained investment in human skills (e.g., specialised training, recruitment, retention and resilient skill pipelines in areas such as cyber warfare, systems integration and maritime repair) is essential.

Shore-based infrastructure – including dock access and maintenance and repair capacity – should also be prioritised as a core enabler of readiness, since availability issues have been associated with outdated and capacity-limited dockyard facilities. Industry partnerships, not just procurement, should be viewed as integral to warfighting readiness.

Industrial timelines, integration issues, and capacity constraints lead to short term vulnerabilities.The Royal Navy should balance operational credibility with long-term investments, which may take years to realise. Additionally, Army-Navy integration should be considered in shaping the Royal Navy’s future. Without a human-centred and realistic industrial approach, the New Hybrid Navy risks becoming technologically advanced but strategically fragile.

Dr Lucie Pebay holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath, where her research examined the contemporary transformation of the French Army. She currently works within the Ministry of Defence for the Naval Staff as a Research and Business Manager, supporting and coordinating research designed to inform Royal Navy planning and decision-making.

The views expressed in this article are personal to the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal Navy.

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